We characterize all n-person multi-valued bargaining solutions, defined on the domain of all finite bargaining problems, and satisfying Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO), Covariance (COV), and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). We show that these solutions are obtained by iteratively maximizing nonsymmetric Nash products and determining the final set of points by so-called LDR decompositions. If, next, we assume the (settheoretic) Axiom of Determinacy, then this class coincides with the class of iterated Nash bargaining solutions; but if we assume the Axiom of Choice then we are able to construct an additional large set of discontinuous and even nonmeasurable solutions. We next show that a number of existing results in the literature as well as some new results are implied by our approach. These include a characterization of all WPO, COV and IIA solutionsincluding single-valued ones -on the domain of all compact bargaining problems, and an extension of a theorem of Birkhoff characterizing translation invariant and homogeneous orderings.
Introduction
In this paper we study n-person multi-valued bargaining solutions satisfying the well-known (cf.
Nash [18] ) axioms of Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO), Covariance (COV), and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), on domains of compact bargaining problems containing all finite problems. Thus, we do not require convexity of bargaining problems. Some caution is needed, therefore, in justifying the Covariance condition, since the usual interpretation associated with the use of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions would imply convexity of the bargaining problems under consideration. Here, to motivate the requirement of Covariance, we just assume that the preferences of the bargainers are uniquely represented up to positive linear transformations.
1 Allowing for multi-valuedness of solutions is a natural consequence when considering non-convex bargaining problems.
Observe that continuity is not imposed as a basic requirement. Adding continuity in general excludes the possibility of selecting from multi-valued Nash bargaining solutions. In some interesting cases this even leads to an impossibility result. In particular, there is no single-valued continuous solution satisfying these three conditions on the domain of compact bargaining problems. 2 On the other hand, without continuity there is generally a large class of solutions additional to the continuous case, albeit that we may need the Axiom of Choice to define them, see Section 4.
Our basic results are the three characterizations presented in Section 3 of the paper, where we consider bargaining solutions defined on the domain of finite bargaining problems. The first result says that any WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solution ϕ must be a refinement of some (nonsymmetric) Nash bargaining solution. More precisely, there is a nonzero nonnegative vector α ∈ R n such that each point x assigned by ϕ maximizes the product Π i x α i i on the bargaining problem under consideration. The level sets of such a ('Nash') product are called 'generalized indifference curves'. If we denote the generalized indifference curve through the vector e = (1, 1, . . . , 1) by I ϕ , the second result says that not only does each WPO, COV and IIA ϕ induce a partition of I ϕ into three sets L, D, and R with specific properties, but also that each such partition induces a different ϕ. These partitions are called LDR decompositions. The set L in this decomposition consists of those points x such that from the bargaining problem 1 We note that also in so-called non-expected utility theories representing utility functions are usually unique up to positive linear transformations, cf. also Denicolò and Mariotti [6] . Moreover, it is possible to justify expected utility without all lotteries being available, cf. Fishburn [7] . Nevertheless, these are only partial justifications for considering the combination of covariance of solutions and non-convexity of bargaining problems. 2 This will be a consequence of Theorems 5.4 and 5.2 in this paper.
{x, e} only the point x is chosen by ϕ. Similarly, if only e is chosen then x ∈ R, and if both x and e are chosen then x ∈ D. Together with the Nash products these LDR decompositions completely characterize the class of WPO, COV, and IIA bargaining solutions. The third result takes this characterization considerably further and shows that each WPO, COV, and IIA bargaining solution can also be described by first iteratively maximizing Nash products and in the end applying an LDR decomposition.
In Section 4 we show that this last characterization is as far as we can go without making additional assumptions. In fact, we show that essentially opposite results are obtained depending on the basic set-theoretic axiom we wish to adopt. Under the so-called Axiom of Determinacy -which, in particular, implies that every subset of the interval [0, 1] is measurable -we obtain that every WPO, COV, and IIA bargaining solution is an iterated Nash bargaining solution.
Under the Axiom of Choice (or, equivalently, Zorn's Lemma) we are able to construct (very) many other -in particular extremely discontinuous and non-measurable -WPO, COV, and IIA bargaining solutions. From a theoretical point of view there seems to be no particular reason to favor one of these basic axioms over the other. From a practical point of view, even though the Axiom of Choice allows for many more solutions, some of which might perhaps be singled out by appealing axioms (we do not pursue this avenue here), these solutions are difficult to use exactly because they can only be obtained using the Axiom of Choice.
3
Section 5 discusses a number of consequences. Adding (a weak form of) continuity results in a characterization of all (nonsymmetric) Nash bargaining solutions on any domain containing the finite domain. Adding symmetry instead of continuity results in a characterization of the symmetric n-person Nash bargaining solution. This basically implies a result by Mariotti [14] , who characterizes the n-person symmetric Nash bargaining solution on the domain of finite bargaining problems, and also the recent result of Xu and Yoshihara [23] , characterizing the symmetric Nash bargaining solution on any domain of compact bargaining problems containing the domain of finite problems. 4 The final result in Section 5 states that on the domain of all compact 5 problems WPO, COV and IIA characterize the set of iterated Nash bargaining solutions. This result -which is also derived in a different way by Naumova and Yanovskaya [19] , see below -not only implies but also refines the main results in Zhou [24] and Denicolò and Mariotti [6] , which state that under a similar set of conditions plus single-valuedness, a solution selects from the maximizers of a Nash product. Here, we show how exactly this selection has to be made.
In Section 6 we show how our results imply a generalization of a theorem of Birkhoff [3] , which
states that an ordering on R n is translation invariant and positive homogeneous if and only if it maximizes a sequence of weighted sums with orthogonal weight vectors. We characterize the orderings that are obtained by dropping homogeneity, in terms of LDR compositions 6 . It follows, moreover, that in Birkhoff's theorem homogeneity can be replaced by the Axiom of Determinacy. Naumova and Yanovskaya [19] use Birkhoff's theorem to derive the characterization of iterated Nash bargaining solutions mentioned before 7 . We could have started this paper from Birkhoff's theorem as well, but since our approach and results are more general, essentially we would have had to redo the proof of that theorem to obtain the generalization that we need. Therefore, the present paper starts from scratch and the generalization of Birkhoff's theorem follows as a byproduct.
A further discussion of related literature is deferred to the relevant places in the paper and also to Section 7. We start with preliminaries in Section 2. Some of the proofs in the paper are collected in a few appendices.
Preliminaries
For x, y ∈ R n , x ≤ y means x i ≤ y i for all i, and x < y means x i < y i for all i. The vector in R n of which all coordinates are zero is denoted by 0. The vector in R n of which all coordinates are one is denoted by e. The set of vectors x in R n with x ≥ 0 is denoted by R n + , and R n ++ denotes the set of vectors x in R n with x > 0. For a, x ∈ R n ++ , ax := (a 1 x 1 , . . . , a n x n ) and x a := (
x n a n ). For a ∈ R n and S ⊂ R n , aS := {ax | x ∈ S}. We use the notation S ⊂ T to indicate that S is a subset of T , so S = T is allowed. For a set S ⊂ R n , the closure of S is denoted by S.
A bargaining problem is a compact and non-empty set B ⊂ R n ++ . (We implicitly assume the 'disagreement point' to be the origin.) A non-empty set D of bargaining problems is called a domain. In this paper we mainly consider the domain F := {F ⊂ R n ++ | F is finite and not empty} 6 Birkhoff's Theorem is formulated for the additive case but there is a one-to-one correspondence between the additive case and the multiplicative case in our framework. 7 In their paper, they consider social welfare orderings instead of choice functions.
of all finite n-person bargaining problems. The domain of all n-person bargaining problems is denoted by C. All other domains D we consider in this paper include F, so F ⊂ D ⊂ C. A bargaining solution ϕ: D R n is a refinement of a bargaining solution ψ:
We define several properties that a bargaining solution ϕ may satisfy.
WPO (Weak Pareto Optimality)
For every B ∈ D and all x, y ∈ B, x < y implies that x / ∈ ϕ(B).
PO (Pareto Optimality)
For every B ∈ D and all x, y ∈ B, x ≤ y and x = y implies that x / ∈ ϕ(B).
IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives)
.
SYM (Symmetry)
Let B ∈ D be symmetric, i.e., B is invariant under any permutation of coordinates. If
x ∈ ϕ(B) and y ∈ B can be obtained from x by permuting its coordinates, then y ∈ ϕ(B).
The properties of WPO, IIA, COV, and SYM were introduced by Nash [18] for single-valued solutions.
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Let ϕ: C R n and ψ: C R n be two bargaining solutions. Suppose that ϕ(C) ∈ C for all C ∈ C. Then the composite bargaining solution ψ • ϕ: C R n is defined by, for all C ∈ C,
Notice that this is indeed a legitimate definition, and that (ψ
A well-known class of bargaining solutions is the class of (asymmetric) Nash bargaining solutions. For a non-zero vector α = (α i ) i∈N ∈ R n the α-bargaining solution N α is defined by, for
A function of the form Notice that N α (C) ∈ C for any C ∈ C. Therefore the following definition makes sense. A solution ϕ on C is an iterated Nash bargaining solution if there are non-zero vectors
The notions of α-bargaining solution, Nash bargaining solution and iterated Nash bargaining 
all C ∈ C, also ϕ satisfies WPO.
Conversely, suppose w.l.o.g.
++ by x 1 := 2 and x i := 1 for all i = 1. Clearly N α 1 (e, x) = {e}. Then, by the continuity of the Nash product, N α 1 (e, x + εe) = {e} for sufficiently small ε > 0. Hence, also ϕ(e, x + εe) = {e} for sufficiently small ε > 0. This x 2 ) and x 3 ∈ ϕ(x 2 , x 3 ) it follows that x 3 ∈ ϕ(x 1 , x 3 ). We shall frequently use the following observation.
Lemma 2.2 Any solution ϕ: D R
n ++ that satisfies IIA is transitive. 9 These solutions were first introduced -for convex two-person bargaining problems and positive weight vectors -by Harsanyi and Selten [9] . 10 Without loss of generality. 
By the following lemma this number is well-defined and positive.
The next lemma prepares for the definition of the generalized indifference curve below.
The set I ϕ (x) is a subset of R n ++ . It is called the generalized indifference curve (through x). We briefly discuss the reason for this name. As we will see in Section 5, I ϕ (x) is indeed the indifference curve through x whenever ϕ satisfies CON, in the sense that I ϕ (x) equals the set of points y ∈ R n ++ with ϕ(x, y) = {x, y} in that case.
When ϕ does not (necessarily) satisfy CON, Lemma 3.2 shows that the point λ(x, y)y is exactly the point of the form λy on the ray emanating from the origin through y where we switch from choosing ϕ(x, λy) = {λy} when λ > λ(x, y) to choosing ϕ(x, λy) = {x} when λ < λ(x, y). The choice for ϕ(x, λ(x, y)y) itself is left unspecified.
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We can say this somewhat differently. Notice that I ϕ (x) = {y ∈ R n ++ | λ(x, y) = 1}. Thus, I ϕ (x) is the set of points y ∈ R n ++ where we switch from choosing ϕ(x, λy) = {λy} when λ > 1 to choosing ϕ(x, λy) = {x} when λ < 1. Again, the choice for ϕ(x, y) itself is left unspecified.
It can be either {x}, or {y}, or {x, y} (although this choice cannot be made entirely arbitrarily as we will see in the next subsections).
We show that a WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solution ϕ is in fact a refinement of an α-bargaining solution for some non-zero vector α ≥ 0. In order to specify for exactly which α,
Define the vector α = (α 1 , . . . , α n ) by
Notice that e ≥ a j . Hence by WPO, λ(a j ) ≥ 1, and therefore α j ≥ 0. Moreover, we have the following lemma.
Proof. We show j λ(a j ) = 2 in two steps. 
We can now show the first (partial) characterization, namely that ϕ is a refinement of the α-Nash bargaining solution, where α is chosen in the above way. 
Proof.
Let ϕ be a bargaining solution that satisfies WPO, COV and IIA. Let α = (α 1 , . . . , α n ) be as defined before. Take F ∈ F and x ∈ F . Suppose that x / ∈ N α (F ).
We show that x / ∈ ϕ(F ).
By IIA it suffices to show that there is a y ∈ F with ϕ(x, y) = {y}.
We show that indeed ϕ(x, y) = {y}.
by Lemma A.5 and Lemma 3.3,
Now from inequality ( * ) we conclude that λ(x, y) = µ < 1. Hence, by Lemma 3.2, ϕ(x, y) = {y}, and the proof is complete.
Thus we can view every WPO, IIA and COV bargaining solution as arising from a Nash bargaining solution, with the additional proviso that ties, or indifferences, within the indifference curve of the Nash bargaining solution may be broken one way or the other. How exactly ties can be broken is the topic of the next two subsections.
The second characterization
In this subsection we show that for a WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solution, ties within the indifference curve of the enveloping Nash bargaining solution can only be broken in a specific way, namely only in a way that respects the covariance requirement together with transitivity.
We give a precise description of the consequences of this observation. 
This implies e ∈ D (where e denotes the neutral element of I), and if x ∈ L then e x ∈ R (where e x denotes the inverse of x). If (in R k ) the operation * is a multiplication, we say that the LDR decomposition is multiplicative, and we say it is additive if the operation * is an addition. Now take an x ∈ R ϕ and y ∈ D ϕ . So, using COV, e ∈ ϕ(x, e) and x ∈ ϕ(xy, x). Hence, by transitivity, e ∈ ϕ(xy, e). However, also xy / ∈ ϕ(xy, y) and e ∈ ϕ(y, e). Hence, by transitivity, xy / ∈ ϕ(xy, e). Thus, ϕ(xy, e) = {e} and xy ∈ R ϕ .
Similarly it can be shown that
Thus, each WPO, IIA and COV bargaining solution ϕ determines a quadruple
where α ≥ 0 is such that the set 13 It is easy to check that Iα is an Abelian multiplicative group.
We show now that the characteristic quadruple of ϕ characterizes the solution ϕ in the following sense. Not only does each WPO, IIA and COV bargaining solution determine a (unique) characteristic quadruple in Q, but conversely also each quadruple in Q uniquely determines a WPO, IIA and COV bargaining solution.
Theorem 3.6 The map Q: W → Q is one-to-one and onto.
Proof. We show that Q has an inverse as follows. Take a quadruple (α, L, D, R) in Q. We
show that there exists a unique WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solution ϕ:
First take an arbitrary set {x, y} ∈ F. Take λ > 0 such that λ
Observe that µ(x, y) is defined in accordance with what the LDR decomposition L, D, R of I α
prescribes for the set { x y , e}. By COV, this also determines how to make the choice for {x, y}.
We argue that µ is transitive. Take
have that λ 1 ≥ 1 and λ 2 ≥ 1. Therefore also λ 1 λ 2 ≥ 1. We distinguish two cases.
We show that ϕ is the unique WPO, IIA and COV bargaining solution ϕ:
A. From the definition of ϕ it follows immediately that ϕ(x, y) = µ(x, y) for all x, y ∈ R n ++ .
From this it follows that
ϕ is a bargaining solution and that it satisfies WPO, IIA, and COV), since all these sets are defined by considering pairs of elements in R n ++ .
B. Take F ∈ F. We claim that ϕ(F ) is not empty. Suppose it were empty. Take a point
In the same way we find an x 3 ∈ F with x 2 / ∈ µ(x 2 , x 3 ). Iterating this procedure yields a sequence
F is finite, we have x r = x t for some r, t with r < t. This violates the transitivity of µ.
by the transitivity of µ.
C2.
Take an
D. Next we show that ϕ satisfies WPO. Take F ∈ F and x, y ∈ F with x < y. Then E. We show that ϕ satisfies COV. Take a ∈ R n ++ , take F ∈ F and take x ∈ ϕ(F ). It suffices to show that ax ∈ ϕ(aF ). Take an arbitrary y ∈ aF . Then 
F1. Take an x ∈ ψ(F ). Take a y ∈ F . Then, from IIA and the fact that ψ(x, y) = µ(x, y), it follows that x ∈ µ(x, y).
F2.
Take an x ∈ F with x ∈ µ(x, y) for all y ∈ F . Since ψ(F ) is not empty, we can take
, and hence x ∈ ψ(F ) by IIA.
The third characterization
In this subsection we further refine the characterization in Theorem 3.6 by taking the analysis of the internal structure of the LDR decomposition a few steps further.
Let ϕ: F R n ++ be a WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solution. We use a recursive process to construct a sequence
STEP I. This is the initialization step. Take J 1 := I ϕ . Go to STEP II.
STEP II. This is the recursion step. Suppose J k has already been defined. Define
14 Note that J 1 is closed by Lemma A.2. Then an induction argument shows that for all k, J k is closed and J k ⊃ J k+1 . Thus we have a sequence
Thus, D is a subset of J k for all k. Furthermore, if n k denotes the dimension of the closed subspace J k , it follows from Theorem B.1 that n k+1 is either equal to n k or equal to n k − 1.
Thus the sequence
I = J 1 ⊃ J 2 ⊃ . . . consists of an initial part J 1 ⊃ . . . ⊃ J K for which n k+1 = n k − 1 holds for all k < K, after which we have that J k = J K for all k ≥ K. The (uniquely defined) number K is called the characteristic number of the LDR decompo- sition L ϕ , D ϕ and R ϕ of I ϕ . The sequence J 1 ⊃ . . . ⊃ J K is called the central chain of the LDR decomposition. The linear subspace J ϕ := J K of I ϕ is called the center of the LDR decomposition. Evidently D ϕ ⊂ J ϕ . Lemma 3.7 Let J ϕ be the center of the LDR decomposition L ϕ , D ϕ and R ϕ of I ϕ . Then either L ϕ ∩ J ϕ is empty or L ϕ ∩ J ϕ is dense in J ϕ .
Proof.
Suppose that L ϕ ∩ J ϕ is not empty. Let K be the characteristic number of the
Canonical coefficients
Let ϕ: F R n ++ be a WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solution. Let α be as constructed in Section 3.1. Let K be the characteristic number of the LDR decomposition L ϕ , D ϕ , and R ϕ of I ϕ = I α , and let
We construct a sequence of orthogonal non-zero vectors
and for all 2 ≤ k ≤ K,
Evidently, we take β 1 := α. We recursively define β 2 , . . . , β K as follows. Suppose that, for
This vector is unique up to scalar multiplication.
Proof. Define the operation ρ:
Then it is straightforward to check that ρ(J 1 ) = H 1 , that ρ is a homeomorphism from J 1 to H 1 , and that ρ is an isomorphism w.r.t. addition on H α and multiplication on I α .
Now it is easy to check that ρ(J
Using the isomorphism ρ it is now easy to show that
Moreover, by taking −β k instead of β k when necessary, we can use Lemma B.2 to guarantee that 
Proof. The proof is in two parts.
A. We show that ϕ is a refinement of N . Note that
Hence, there is a (uniquely determined) 2
However, by the choice of the canonical coefficients, {x 
Proof.
Let β 1 , . . . , β K be the canonical coefficients of N . Let ϕ be an arbitrary WPO,
COV and IIA refinement of N , and let (α, L ϕ , D ϕ , R ϕ ) be its characteristic quadruple. Then
Hence, using Theorem 3.6, The bargaining solution that is associated with the characteristic The remainder of this paper is devoted to discussing known and new consequences of the characterizations derived in this section.
To be or not to be
In this section we use the characterizations derived in the preceding section to discuss the existence of WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solutions that are not iterated Nash bargaining solutions. We divide the collection of WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solutions into two types: iterated Nash bargaining solutions are of type I and all other WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solutions are of type II.
On some domains, solutions of the second type do not exist, see e.g. Naumova and Yanovskaya 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 
Proof.
Suppose that R is a measurable set. Let λ denote the Borel-Lebesgue measure on R. We derive a contradiction in three steps.
Hence, due to the translation invariance and rotation invariance of the Borel-Lebesgue measure λ,
This however contradicts the assumption that R and L are disjoint.
STEP II.
Take u, v ∈ R, u < v. We show that A := R ∩ (u, v) is negligible. Take ε > 0.
Since A is a measurable set, Theorem C.6 implies that there exists an open set U ⊃ A such that λ(U \ A) < ε. Since U is an open set in R, we can write U as the disjoint union of open intervals (u n , v n ), n ∈ N. Hence, using step I to obtain the second inequality,
This implies that A is negligible. Proof. Let z 1 , . . . , z k be a basis for H. We say that a basis element z i is superfluous when at least one of the following two inclusions holds:
We argue by contradiction that not all basis elements are superfluous. Suppose that all basis elements are superfluous. Assume w.l.o.g. that (1) holds for all i (when only (2) holds, take
Then the set G of points z ∈ H for which there are non-negative numbers Determinacy however, the picture changes. If, instead, we assume Zorn's Lemma, a statement that is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice, it is possible to construct WPO, COV, and IIA bargaining solutions that are not iterated Nash bargaining solutions. We show how this can 15 An interesting observation in this context, pointed out to us by Professor Jan Mycielski, is that the subclass L[R] of the universe V of all sets forms a model of ZF in which AD as well as a version of AC known as the Axiom of Dependent Choice (DC) are true. DC still allows one to perform virtually all constructions known within analysis as long as one restricts oneself to working in separable metric spaces. A comprehensive discussion can be found in Marek and Mycielski [13] . be done. Let H α ⊂ R n be defined by
Any additive functional f : H α → R defines an LDR decomposition as follows. Note that the operation ρ:
is an isomorphism w.r.t. addition on H α and multiplication on I α . Define
It is easy to check that L f , D f and R f form an LDR decomposition of I α . Thus, every additive functional f induces a WPO, IIA and COV bargaining solution ϕ(f ), and two such functionals
We use the above observation to construct a plethora of WPO, IIA and COV bargaining solutions as follows. Of course every linear functional f : H α → R induces a solution ϕ(f ).
However, using Zorn's Lemma, we can construct many more different additive functionals, and hence many more different WPO, IIA and COV bargaining solutions. First we need some notation. Let X be a non-empty set and let be a binary relation on X that satisfies [1] (reflexivity) for all x ∈ X we have x x, and
[2] (transitivity) for all x, y, z ∈ X we have x z whenever both x y and y z.
We say that is a partial order on X. A subset C of X is called a chain if for any two elements
x and y of C we have at least one of the two inequalities x y and y x. A chain C of X is said to have an upper bound if there exists an element a of X such that x a for all x in C.
An element a of X is called maximal if for any x in X the inequality a x only holds if x a holds as well.
Lemma 4.5 (Zorn)
Suppose that every chain of X has an upper bound. Then X has a maximal element.
Using Zorn's Lemma we can easily prove the following result, due to Hamel [8] .
Theorem 4.6 R n has a basis over Q. Consequently, also H α has a basis over Q.
Proof. Let X be the set of Q-independent sets in R n , ordered by set inclusion. Let C be a chain in X. Then ∪ B∈C B is an upper bound of C. Hence, by Zorn's Lemma, X has a maximal element, say B. It is straightforward to prove that B is a basis of R n over Q. The second part of the theorem follows from the observation that H α is linearly isomorphic to R n−1 .
We construct a multitude of WPO, IIA and COV bargaining solutions as follows. 
Note that ϕ(f ) might still be equal to ϕ(g), even when f = g (for example, when g = 2f ).
Nevertheless, the qualification 'plethora' still applies for the following reason.
Theorem 4.8 Assume the Axiom of Choice. Then there exists a WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solution on F that is of type II. The cardinality of the collection of type II bargaining solutions is strictly larger than the cardinality of the collection of iterated Nash bargaining
solutions.
) at least when there is a b ∈ B for which for example f (b) > 0 and
Thus the number of different LDR decompositions that can be constructed this way is still at least as large as the cardinality of 3 B . On the other hand the set of all iterated Nash bargaining solutions clearly has the cardinality of R n . Now, B necessarily has the cardinality of R n , while, by the Cantor argument, 3 B has a higher cardinality than B. In particular, not every solution generated in the above way is an iterated Nash bargaining solution, and type II bargaining solutions must necessarily exist.
Consequences of the characterizations
In this section we discuss some consequences of the characterizations in Section 3.
Nash bargaining solutions
We show that the class of Nash bargaining solutions is characterized by WPO, COV, IIA and CON on any domain D containing the domain of finite bargaining problems and contained in the domain of all compact bargaining problems. 
Proof.

A. Suppose that
It is straightforward to check that N α has the same characteristic quadruple. Hence, by Theorem 3.6, ϕ = N α .
B.
Suppose that ϕ is a Nash bargaining solution. Then I ϕ ⊃ D ϕ . Take x ∈ I ϕ . We show that x ∈ D ϕ . By assumption there is a non-zero vector α ≥ 0 such that ϕ = N α . Then clearly
Now we can prove the following characterization of Nash bargaining solutions. 
Proof.
We only prove the only-if direction. Let ϕ satisfy the axioms in the theorem. By In different but equivalent formulations this result was also derived in Kaneko and Nakamura [12] and Naumova and Yanovskaya [19] .
Imposing SYM instead of CON singles out the symmetric Nash bargaining solution N α with α i = 1/n for every i. Proof. We only prove the if-direction. Let ϕ be a bargaining solution with these properties.
Obviously, α i = 1/n for all i. Take x ∈ I ϕ . It is sufficient to prove that x ∈ D ϕ . It is not difficult (cf. Xu and Yoshihara [23] ) to find an a ∈ R n ++ such that a = ae can be obtained from ax by a permutation of coordinates. Consider the finite bargaining problem B consisting of ax and all vectors obtainable from ax by a permutation of coordinates. By SYM, ϕ(B) = B.
In particular, a, ax ∈ ϕ(B). By COV and IIA, ϕ(x, e)
This result was also derived in Mariotti [14] and Xu and Yoshihara [23] .
Compact domain
In this subsection we show that any WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solution on the domain C of all compact bargaining problems is an iterated Nash bargaining solution. As already established, under the Axiom of Determinacy a WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solution defined on any domain D that includes F is an iterated Nash bargaining solution. Theorem 3.1 of Naumova and Yanovskaya [19] shows that on the domain C this remains true even without the Axiom of Determinacy. Their proof is based on a theorem of Birkhoff (see the next section for a discussion of that theorem). Using Theorem 3.9 we show the above result by arguing directly that WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solutions of type II cannot be extended to the domain C of all compact bargaining problems. 
Then, by translation invariance of the Euclidean distance and preservation of group structure by ρ,
In particular
is a compact set. Thus, B ∈ C. We show that ϕ(B) must be empty, which contradicts the assumption that ϕ is a bargaining solution. Firstly notice that ϕ(e,
Hence, e / ∈ ϕ(B) by IIA. Secondly notice that ϕ(e, r) = {e} because r is an element of R ⊂ R ϕ . Hence, r / ∈ ϕ(B) by IIA. Thirdly, for any m ∈ N, by COV we have However, since this would require a long pre-discussion and several extra lifting results before we could present our main observations, we decided not to pursue this avenue, and simply to present the results on additive groups separately without any further proofs.
We first formulate the Birkhoff theorem [3] . An ordering on R n is a binary relation on R n that is complete, reflexive, and transitive. We write x ≺ y if x y and not y x. We write x ∼ y if x y and y x. An ordering is translation invariant if for all x, y, z ∈ R n , x y holds whenever x + z y + z. The ordering is positive homogeneous if for all x, y ∈ R n and all λ > 0, x y holds whenever λx λy. Using the techniques we developed in this paper we can prove the following generalization of Birkhoff's theorem. For a sequence β = (β 1 , . . . , β m ) of orthogonal vectors, write
Clearly H β is a linear subspace of R n . Let L, D and R form an additive LDR decomposition of H β . We say that the ordering is induced by the quadruple (β, L, D, R) if x y holds precisely when one of the following two cases is valid.
, and y − x ∈ R.
Theorem 6.2 An ordering is translation invariant if and only if there exists a sequence β of orthogonal vectors and an LDR decomposition L, D and R of H β such that is induced by the quadruple (β, L, D, R) and either
R = φ or R is dense in H β .
The correspondence between translation invariant orderings and quadruples (β, L, D, R)
with either R = φ or R dense in H β is one-to-one and onto up to scalar multiplication of the orthogonal vectors in the sequence β.
Proof of Birkhoff 's theorem.
It is straightforward to show that, for a sequence β = (β 1 , . . . , β m ) of orthogonal vectors, β is translation invariant and positive homogeneous. We show the other implication.
Suppose that is translation invariant and positive homogeneous. Let (β, L, D, R) be the associated quadruple. We show that R is empty. Suppose it is not. Then R is dense in H β .
So, by Lemma 4.3 there is a line P in H β through the origin such that P ∩ R is dense in P .
Take a point r ∈ P ∩ R. Notice that r = 0. Since L = −R, P ∩ L is also dense in P . So, there must be a µ > 0 such that µr ∈ L. Then however 0 ≺ r and µr ≺ 0. This violates positive homogeneity.
Theorem 6.3 Assume the Axiom of Determinacy. Then an ordering is translation invariant if and only if there is a sequence
Proof. Suppose that is translation invariant. Let (β, L, D, R) be the associated quadruple.
We show that R is empty. Suppose it is not. Then R is dense in H β . So, by Lemma 4.3 there is a line P in H β through the origin such that P ∩ R is dense in P . This contradicts Theorems 4.2 and 4.1.
If x ≺ y holds for all x, y ∈ R n with x < y we say that satisfies Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO). For WPO orderings we obtain the same set of results, with the only proviso that the first vector β 1 in the sequence is non-zero and non-negative.
INDEPENDENCE OF AXIOMS.
In fact these results show that the independence of the axiom of positive homogeneity in the characterization of orderings of the form β is debatable. When we accept the Axiom of Choice, positive homogeneity is indeed an independent axiom. However, when we accept the Axiom of Determinacy, Theorem 6.3 shows that the axiom of positive homogeneity can be dropped from the formulation of Birkhoff's theorem.
ADDITIVE FUNCTIONS.
As a final curiosity, we observe that under the Axiom of Determinacy, every additive function on the reals is necessarily linear. However, under the Axiom of Choice, there are many more non-linear additive functions than linear functions.
Discussion and conclusion
In this final section we discuss independence of the basic axioms, and we further discuss related literature. We end with some concluding remarks.
Independence of the axioms
We show the independence of the basic axioms used in this paper.
Not WPO The bargaining solution ϕ: F R n ++ defined by ϕ(F ) := F for all F ∈ F satisfies IIA, COV and CON, but not WPO.
Not IIA The bargaining solution WPO: F R n ++ defined by, for all F ∈ F,
satisfies WPO, COV and CON, but not IIA.
Not COV The bargaining solution ϕ:
satisfies WPO, IIA and CON, but not COV.
Not CON Bargaining solutions of Type II as constructed in Section 4.2, or iterated Nash bargaining solutions that are not Nash bargaining solutions, satisfy WPO, COV and IIA but not CON.
Note that the first three counterexamples can be extended to any domain D with F ⊂ D ⊂ C.
As for the continuity axiom, on the domain C the independence follows from Theorems 5.2 and 5.4.
Related literature
We continue and extend the discussion started in Section 2.
Kaneko [11] characterizes the symmetric Nash (multi-valued) bargaining solution on the domain of all compact n-person bargaining problems by the axioms PO, IIA, COV, SYM, and CON.
A recent improvement of this result is obtained by Xu and Yoshihara [23] , who are able to drop CON from this set of axioms. Both results follow from Theorem 5.3, which, in turn, is a relatively straightforward consequence of the results in Section 3. Zhou [24] shows that, on the domain of compact n-person bargaining problems, any singlevalued solution satisfying COV, IIA, and strict individual rationality refines some Nash bargaining solution. As in Roth [21] it can be shown that these conditions imply WPO, and thus
Zhou's result follows from our basic results in Section 3. Moreover, Theorem 5.4 shows exactly how this refinement works. This also applies to Denicolò and Mariotti [6] , who derive a similar result as Zhou [24] under somewhat stronger conditions. Their proof is based on a result of d'Aspremont [1] , characterizing orderings.
For a discussion of Naumova and Yanovskaya [19] see, in particular, Section 5.2. For the relation with Kaneko and Nakamura [12] see Section 5.1.
To our knowledge the papers mentioned so far are the ones that are most directly related to our work. Herrero [10] and Maschler et al. [16] consider the symmetric Nash bargaining solution on domains of compact bargaining problems from a more geometrical point of view, and complement it by a noncooperative game ( [10] ) or by a dynamic system ( [16] ). Conley and
Wilkie [4] and Mariotti [15] study a different single-valued extension of the symmetric Nash bargaining solution to non-convex bargaining problems.
Concluding remarks
The Clearly, by WPO, x itself is an element of the generalized indifference curve I ϕ (x), and each ray emanating from the origin into R n ++ intersects this curve at most once. We show that each ray also intersects this curve at least once.
We need a few more facts about the generalized indifference curve. First, generalized indifference curves partition R n ++ . Another way of saying this is that generalized indifference curves are the equivalence classes of an equivalence relation.
Proof. (a) Suppose that z ∈ I ϕ (y). We show that z ∈ I ϕ (x). Take λ > 0. By (b1) and (b2), λ(y, x) = 1 and x ∈ I ϕ (y).
Proof. Let (y m ) m∈N be a sequence in I ϕ (x) that converges to y. Proof. Follows immediately from COV.
Proof. Take a ∈ R n ++ and q ∈ Q. Suppose that ax ∈ I ϕ (x).
(a) First we show that a k x ∈ I ϕ (x) for all k ∈ N. Since x, ax ∈ I ϕ (x), this is true for k = 0, 1.
by Lemma A.3. Hence, a k x ∈ I(x) for all k ∈ N.
(b) Next, take a k ∈ N, k = 0. We show that a
for all 0 ≤ l ≤ k − 1. So, iterated application of transitivity yields that x ∈ ϕ(x, λ k ax). This contradicts the assumption that ax ∈ I ϕ (x). Hence, ϕ(x, λa
(b2) Take λ < 1. Suppose that λa
by transitivity. This contradicts the assumption that ax ∈ I ϕ (x). Hence, ϕ(x, λa
From (b1) and (b2) it follows that a
(c) Since ax ∈ I ϕ (x), we know that x ∈ I ϕ (ax) by Lemma A.1. Hence, by Lemma A.3, also
From (a), (b) and (c) it follows that a q x ∈ I ϕ (x).
Lemma A. 
Proof.
Define H as the set of vectors y ∈ R 
where the fifth equality follows from the definition of a j , while the sixth equality follows from both the definition of a j and Lemma 3.3. Hence, b ∈ H.
A2.
Conversely, let y ∈ H. So, y ∈ R n ++ and i y
We show that there are
Write 
So, dim(Im(A)) = rank(A) = rank(B) ≥ n − 1, and Im(A) = Z. However, since i y αi i = 1, we have i α i z i = 0 and z is an element of Z. Hence, the system z = Aµ of linear equations has a solution.
Proof.
Suppose this is not the case. Then, since D ϕ ⊂ J k , there is a point x ∈ P k−1 with
x ∈ L ϕ ∩ J k−1 and a point y ∈ P k−1 with y ∈ R ϕ ∩ J k−1 . Then there exists a path 20 W from
This contradicts the definition of J k .
C Appendix: regularity of the Borel-Lebesgue measure
In this appendix we provide some basic measure theoretic notions as well as a proof of the regularity of the Borel-Lebesgue measure. The appendix does not contain any original results and is added merely for convenience of the reader.
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Let X be a non-empty set.
Definition C.1 A collection A of subsets of X is called an algebra if:
Conditions (ii) and (iii) automatically imply that finite intersections of elements of A are also elements of A.
Definition C.2 An algebra A is called a σ-algebra if it moreover holds that: 
This condition is called the σ-additivity of µ. Let τ be a topology on X. With this topology we can associate a σ-algebra on X in the following way. Notice that the collection 2 X of all subsets of X is a σ-algebra that contains τ .
So, the collection V of all σ-algebra's that contain τ is not empty. This means that
is a non-empty collection of subsets of X. Even, it is a σ-algebra that, evident by construction, contains τ . We say that τ generates the σ-algebra B.
Definition C.4 The σ-algebra generated by the topology τ is called the Borel σ-algebra generated by τ .
One can extend a measure µ on a Borel σ-algebra B a bit further. There is in fact a largest collection of sets, called the collection of measurable sets, on which the given measure µ can still meaningfully be defined. We do not go into the details of the construction of this collection, but simply state that a set A ⊂ X is measurable -or, equivalently, is an element of M - 
REGULARITY OF MEASURE
Let B be the Borel σ-algebra associated with a metric space (X, d) and let µ be a measure on B, and let M be the associated collection of measurable sets. We assume that µ is finite, which means that µ(X) < ∞.
Definition C. 5 We say that µ is regular if, for every measurable set A in M and every real number ε > 0, we can find a closed set F and an open set U such that F ⊂ A ⊂ U and
That is, a finite measure is regular if every measurable set can be enclosed by an open set, and can itself enclose a closed set, such that the measure of the difference between the sandwiching sets is arbitrarily close to zero. Finiteness is not a real requirement for regularity. It is sufficient for our purposes though, and it simplifies the proof.
Theorem C.6 Every finite measure µ on M is regular.
Proof.
Let µ be an arbitrary finite measure on X. Let R be the collection of sets A ⊂ X for which for every ε > 0 there exist a closed set F and an open set U such that
Notice that µ is regular if and only if M is a subset of R.
First we show that B is a subset of R in two steps. First of all we will show that any closed set is an element of R. Then we will show that R is a σ-algebra. Since B is by definition the smallest σ-algebra that contains all open, and thus also all closed, sets these two facts together imply that B is a subset of R.
Step 1. Take an arbitrary closed set A. We will show that it is an element of R. To this end, take a real number ε > 0. We will construct F and U . Since A is closed we can simply take F := A. In order to construct U , define for each natural number n the open set 
Hence,
where the second equality holds since F ⊂ U . This shows that A is indeed an element of R.
Step 2. Now we will show that R is a σ-algebra. The first requirement of the definition of a σ-algebra is easy to check since it follows from the previous step that the empty set is an element of R.
Part A. Next we have to show that X \ A is an element of R for every element A of R. We will even show a somewhat stronger statement, namely that A \ B is an element of R for any two sets A and B in R. Part B. To show the third requirement, let A 1 , A 2 , . . . be a sequence in R. We have to show that A := ∪ n A n is also an element of R. This we will also do in two steps. In this first step we make the additional assumption that the sequence is mutually disjoint. Now take a real number ε > 0. Since A n is an element of R, we can take an open set U n and a closed set F n such that
So, take two sets
Since the sequence A 1 , A 2 , . . . is mutually disjoint, it is clear that the sequence Obviously the sequence is mutually disjoint. Furthermore, B 1 = A 1 is clearly an element of R.
So, since A 2 is also an element of R we know by the result in Part A that B 2 = A 2 \ B 1 is also an element of R. Hence, by iterating this argument we obtain that every B n is an element of R. 
